Attacks against GPS Spoofing Increase in Southeast Asia and the Middle East

In 2025, spoofing attacks on GPS are still causing significant issues for both air and sea travel. These problems became much more common in the summer of 2024. During that time, flights over conflict regions, particularly in Eastern Europe, Russia, the Middle East, Myanmar, and Southeast Asia, experienced frequent disruptions.

Recently, the Indian military reported GPS spoofing problems on flights delivering aid to Myanmar after a major earthquake on March 28th. These flights had to rely on backup navigation systems. A year ago, GPS spoofing disrupted over 1,500 flights daily in the Middle East and more than 2,000 worldwide. Although attacks decreased after that, they began rising again late last year and into 2025.

While amateurs using cheap devices can conduct GPS spoofing on a small scale, it is more likely that these attacks are orchestrated by nation-states. Benoit Figuet, co-founder of SkAI Data Services, explains that the scope and power of these attacks suggest they involve state or military actions. "We've observed more spoofing near Myanmar, even before the earthquake, probably because of ongoing political and military tensions," he notes.

Such electronic countermeasures have become common in the Middle East since the Israeli-Hamas conflict began and in Eastern Europe following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These tactics aim to disrupt missile and drone targeting systems. The GPS attacks expose the vulnerabilities in our current technology, called Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), because attackers only need to overpower existing signals. This highlights the increased dangers to civilian air and sea travel during conflicts.

GPS spoofing, in theory, is quite straightforward. Most GPS devices can't identify the direction of a signal. Spoofing involves sending fake signals stronger than genuine satellite signals, misleading GPS devices into calculating wrong positions. Jamming devices can flood GPS receivers with noise, but spoofing involves using a stronger signal to replace accurate GPS data with false information.

According to a report by SkAI Data Services, there was a significant rise in GPS spoofing in the Middle East during April 2024. By November, the attacks had decreased substantially, but they began to rise again in December and have continued at that level into 2025. Raphael Monstein, another co-founder of SkAI, remarks, "In 2024, we noted an increase and a decrease due to changes in the Middle East, but Russia remains very active."

A year ago, most attacks were concentrated in the Middle East. Now, this region accounts for less than a third, while activities in Russia, Kaliningrad, and the Black Sea dominate the rest. Increased spoofing is also reported in Asia, especially near the India-Pakistan border and Mainland Southeast Asia. Thailand and Cambodia are starting to see some activity, too.

"We don't have perfect coverage," Figuet admits. "We would likely discover more interference with more receivers in the India-Pakistan border areas or Myanmar."

To counter spoofing, pilots in some areas have begun expecting GPS signal loss and rely on alternative navigation methods. Technological solutions exist, such as using controlled reception pattern antennas (CRPA), which give GPS receivers directional capabilities. This method is widely adopted by militaries who also encrypt their GPS signals.

Advanced technologies are under development. For instance, quantum-enabled sensing uses principles from quantum physics to identify magnetic "landmarks" for precise navigation, reports from Q-CTRL and Advanced Navigation state. Quantum sensors are essential for the consistent detection and tracking of these landmarks from moving vehicles, highlighting a promising direction for future navigation systems.